Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes by Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner
 
 














































  Bonn Graduate School of Economics 
  Department of Economics 
  University of Bonn 
  Kaiserstrasse 1 
  D-53113 Bonn
 
Discussion Paper 10/2010 
 
Technology Choice and Incentives under 

















































  Financial support by the 
  Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 
  through the 
  Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) 
  is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
  Deutsche Post World Net is a sponsor of the BGSE. Technology Choice and Incentives under
Relative Performance Schemes∗
Matthias Kräkel† Anja Schöttner‡
Abstract
We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous
workers are motivated by relative performance schemes: If workers’
abilities and the production technology are complements, the ﬁrm
may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though
this technology would costlessly increase each worker’s productivity.
Due to the complementarity between ability and technology, under
technology adoption the productivity of a more able worker increases
more strongly than the productivity of a less able colleague, thereby
reducing the motivation of both workers to exert eﬀort under a rel-
ative incentive scheme. We show that this adverse incentive eﬀect is
dominant and, consequently, keeps the ﬁrm from introducing a better
production technology if talent uncertainty is suﬃciently high and/or
monitoring of workers is suﬃciently precise.
Key Words: complementarities; heterogeneous workers; production
technology; tournament.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82; D86; J33; M52.
∗Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant SFB/TR
15, is gratefully acknowledged.
†University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, tel: +49 228
733914, fax: +49 228 739210, e-mail: m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de.
‡University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, tel: +49 228
739217, fax: +49 228 739210, e-mail: anja.schoettner@uni-bonn.de.
11 Introduction
A fundamental incentive problem in organizations arises from the fact that
workers’ individual performance signals are often unveriﬁable, i.e., they are
observable by the ﬁrm but not by a third party. In such a situation, popular
incentive schemes like bonuses and piece rates cannot be used because of
potential employer opportunism: Ex-post the ﬁrm can save labor costs by
wrongly claiming that workers have performed poorly. Since workers antici-
pate such opportunistic behavior, incentives would be completely erased.
However, when performance measures are unveriﬁable, the ﬁrm can still
rely on relative incentive schemes or rank-order tournaments for incentive
provision (Malcomson 1984, 1986).1 In practice, we can observe diverse vari-
ants of relative incentive schemes, e.g., job-promotion tournaments (Baker,
Gibbs and Holmström 1994, Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barmby
2001), sales contests (Kalra and Shi 2001; Murphy, Dacin and Ford 2004;
Lim, Ahearne and Ham 2009), forced-distribution systems (Murphy 1992;
Thomas 2002), and bonus pools (Kanemoto and MacLeod 1992; Rajan and
Reichelstein 2006, 2009; Budde 2009). Under each variant, the ﬁrm commits
to pay a certain collective amount of money to the workers. Such a com-
mitment is credible because a third party can verify whether the collective
amount has been paid out by the ﬁrm. This collective money is distributed
a m o n gt h ew o r k e r sa c c o r d i n gt ot h e i rrelative performance. Since the ﬁrm is
forced to pay out the total amount of money, it has no incentive to misrep-
resent the workers’ performance. This important self-commitment property
assures worker incentives.
In this paper, we point out that the use of relative performance schemes
can be highly problematic if the ﬁrm can choose between diﬀerent production
technologies. We characterize situations in which the ﬁrm foregoes to install
a new technology although this technology would increase each worker’s pro-
1Another well-known solution to the unveriﬁability problem are relational (or self-
enforcing) contracts (see, e.g., Bull 1987; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2002). For a rela-
tional contract to be feasible, the ﬁrm’s loss from reneging must be suﬃciently large, e.g.,
the employer-employee relationship needs to be sustained with suﬃciently high probability
in the future and the associated future proﬁt must not be discounted heavily.
2ductivity and is costlessly available. When choosing the technology, the ﬁrm
faces the following trade-oﬀ: On the one hand, a more advanced technol-
ogy enhances each worker’s productivity (productivity eﬀect). On the other
hand, if worker ability and ﬁrm technology are complements and workers
diﬀer in their abilities, the new technology increases the productivity of a
more able worker more strongly than the productivity of a less able worker.
Thus, the outcome of the tournament is less responsive to changes in eﬀort
and, consequently, both workers exert less eﬀort (adverse incentive eﬀect).
If the adverse incentive eﬀect dominates the productivity eﬀect, the ﬁrm will
not adopt the advanced technology.
In a next step, we use a parameterized example to highlight the impact
of worker heterogeneity on technology choice. We show that, the higher the
degree of worker heterogeneity and the higher the uncertainty about work-
ers’ ex-ante unknown talents, the more likely the ﬁrm will choose the less
productive technology. In particular, we compare two labor market situa-
tions that diﬀer in the expected ability of the worker pool. We demonstrate
that the ﬁrm may adopt the more advanced technology only in the situation
where the worker pool is of lower average quality. Such a situation occurs
if talent uncertainty in the worker pool of higher average ability is suﬃ-
ciently high compared to the pool of lower average quality. Furthermore, if
workers’ equilibrium eﬀorts are rather small under either technology due to
imprecise performance measurement or steep marginal eﬀort costs, the ad-
verse incentive eﬀect of technology adoption is not severe. As a result, if the
ﬁrm’s monitoring technology is imprecise, the ﬁrm is more inclined to invest
in a better production technology. Hence, if worker ability and production
technology are complements in the ﬁrm’s production function, monitoring
technology and production technology are substitutes.
The theoretical setting with ability and technology being complements
ﬁts well with the situation observed in the last decades where ﬁrms intensely
invested in information technologies (IT). Initially, investment in IT was used
to save labor and to substitute capital for low-ability work. However, nowa-
days IT and workers’ abilities are mainly seen as complements (see, among
many others, Applegate, Cash and Mills 1988; Berndt, Morrison and Rosen-
3blum 1992; Hitt and Snir 1999; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002).
IT is used by high-ability workers for improving time to market in research
and development and improving service to key customers, for example. In
other words, rather complex IT is used by ﬁrms for intensively exploiting the
potential of their high-ability workers, hence making them more productive.
Besides the literature cited above, our paper is related to the work on
rank-order tournaments starting with the seminal articles by Lazear and
Rosen (1981) and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983). Subsequent papers pointed to
speciﬁc disadvantages of tournaments. Two major problems of tournaments
have been emphasized in the literature. First, workers can improve their
relative positions in the ranking by investing in counterproductive eﬀort or
sabotage (Lazear 1989; Konrad 2000; Chen 2003; Münster 2007; Amegashie
and Runkel 2007; Gürtler 2008). Second, similar to cartels in market com-
petition, tournament participants can collectively gain by a stable collusion
that minimizes eﬀort costs (Ishiguro 2004; Amegashie 2006; Chen 2006; Sut-
ter and Strassmair 2009). In this paper, we identify a further problem of
tournaments — an adverse eﬀect on technology choice given that worker abil-
ity and production technology are complements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we introduce the model setup. Section 3 solves the workers’ problem of ef-
fort choice in the tournament. Section 4 focusses on the ﬁrm’s problems
of designing optimal tournament prizes and choosing the optimal produc-
tion technology. O’Keeﬀe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984) and Schotter and
Weigelt (1992) diﬀerentiate between two ways of modeling tournaments with
heterogeneous contestants — so-called "unfair" and "uneven" contests. Un-
til Section 4, the paper considers the case of unfair tournaments, in which
heterogeneous workers choose the same eﬀort levels in equilibrium. To check
robustness of our ﬁndings, Section 5 turns to the case of uneven contests
with asymmetric equilibria. We show that the crucial economic eﬀects are
still present in this more complicated case. Section 6 concludes.
42T h e M o d e l
We consider a ﬁrm that employs two workers. All parties are risk neu-
tral. Workers are protected by limited liability so that all payments to them
must be non-negative. Worker  ( =1 2) produces the monetary output
( )+. Here,  ≥ 0 denotes worker ’s eﬀort choice,  is the worker’s
exogenously given ability, and  characterizes the ﬁrm’s production technol-
ogy. Furthermore,  is a random variable, where 1 and 2 are identically and
independently distributed. Let (·) denote the cdf of 2−1 and (·)=0(·)
the corresponding density. We assume that (·) is single-peaked at zero.2
The technology parameter  ∈ { } is chosen by the ﬁrm. It can
either use a more advanced technology  =  or a less advanced one
 =   . For simplicity, we assume that technology adoption is free.3




  0. In particular, this means that, holding eﬀort constant, a
better technology increases the output of each worker. Furthermore, output
is concave in eﬀort, i.e., 2
2
 ≤ 0. The marginal productivity of eﬀort in-
creases with a better technology, i.e., 2
 ≥ 0. However, we do not impose
a restriction on the sign of 2
, implying that technology and ability can be
substitutes or complements. In case of substitutes ( 2
 ≤ 0), the marginal
productivity of ability decreases under the better technology. Put diﬀerently,
productivity diﬀerences due to distinct abilities are evened out because the
advanced technology increases the productivity of less able workers more
strongly. For example, this happens if the new technology makes the pro-
duction task easier for workers of lower ability, so that they can keep up with
more capable colleagues. Such a situation might occur if the ﬁrm adopts an
easier-to-handle computer operation system, like switching from MS-DOS
2The assumption of a unimodal distribution is common in tournament models; see,
e.g., Dixit (1987), Drago et al. (1996), Hvide (2002), or Chen (2003). It holds for many
distribution functions. For example, if 1 and 2 are normally distributed, the convolution
(·) is again normal. If 1 and 2 are uniformly distributed, the distribution of 2 − 1
will be triangular.
3In practice, technology adoption is typically costly, where the adoption of a more
advanced production technology is more expensive to the ﬁrm. Thus, introducing costs
for technology adoption would only reinforce our result that the ﬁrm may prefer the less
productive technology.
5to MS-Windows. By contrast, if technology and ability are complements
( 2
  0), more able types beneﬁtm o r ef r o mt h ea d v a n c e dt e c h n o l o g y ,
e.g., if the new technology is complex and diﬃcult to handle (as replacing
typewriters with personal computers). Finally, to simplify the analysis, we
assume that the marginal productivity of eﬀort does not interact with ability,
i.e., 2
 =0 .4
A worker’s ability can be either high or low,  ∈ { },w h e r e 
 ≥ 0. The probability that a worker is of high ability is denoted by
 ∈ (01) and is common knowledge. After accepting the contract oﬀered by
the ﬁrm and entering into the employment relationship, each worker becomes
familiar with the task to be conducted in this particular ﬁrm, and can thus
assess how good he will be at it. Consequently, every worker learns his
own ability. Moreover, each worker also observes the type of his colleague,
whereas the ﬁrm never observes workers’ abilities. This assumption captures
the fact that employees who work closely together usually possess better
information about one another’s talents than the ﬁrm. For simplicity, an
agent’s reservation utility is zero.
Worker ’s costs of eﬀort are () with 0 () 00 ()  0 for all  
0,a n d(0) = 0. To guarantee interior solutions, we further impose the
restriction that 
 (0 )  0 (0), and to ensure concavity of the ﬁrm’s
o b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o n ,w ei m p o s e000()  0 for all   0.A w o r k e r ’ s e ﬀort
choice is unobservable, whereas his output is observable by the parties within
the ﬁrm but unveriﬁable to outsiders. Thus, individual pay-for-performance
schemes are infeasible. Therefore, the ﬁrm employs a rank-order tournament
to provide its workers with eﬀort incentives.5 In a rank-order tournament,
4The assumption 2
 =0implies that we focus on the analysis of "unfair contests"
in the sense of O’Keeﬀe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984) and Schotter and Weigelt (1992),
who diﬀerentiate between "unfair" and "uneven" contests as two alternative ways of mod-
eling heterogeneous players. In unfair contests, players exerting the same eﬀort level have
diﬀerent winning probabilities. Technically, eﬀort and ability additively enter the produc-
tion function, leading to symmetric equilibria. However, in uneven contests eﬀort and
ability are multiplicatively connected (either in the production or the cost function), thus
yielding asymmetric equilibria. We brieﬂy discuss uneven contests in Section 5.
5See Malcomson (1984, 1986) on the self-commitment property of tournaments that
allows their application in situations with unveriﬁable performance signals.
6the worker with the higher output obtains the winner prize ,w h e r e a st h e
other worker receives the loser prize ,  . Due to workers’ limited liability,
both prizes must be non-negative.
Timing is as follows. At the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm makes the technological
choice  ∈ { }, which is publicly observable. Thereafter, it oﬀers two
randomly chosen workers a contract specifying tournament prizes  and .
Given that workers accept, they enter the ﬁrm and observe abilities. In
stage 3, workers simultaneously choose their eﬀort levels. Then, the random
variables 1 and 2 are realized and each worker’s output is observed. Finally,
the tournament prizes are paid.
3W o r k e r s ’ E ﬀort Choices
In this section, we derive workers’ equilibrium eﬀo r tl e v e l sg i v e nt h eﬁrm’s
technological choice and the tournament prizes  and .W h e nw o r k e r sc h o o s e
eﬀort, they know the technology parameter .T h u s ,g i v e nt h ee ﬀort choice
2 of worker 2, worker 1 chooses eﬀort 1 to solve
max
1
 + ((1 1) − (2 2)) · ( − ) − (1)
Similarly, worker 2 chooses 2 to solve
max
2
 +[ 1− ((1 1) − (2 2))] · ( − ) − (2)
We assume that the functional forms are such that worker ’s objective func-
tion is concave in  for all  ( =1 2; 6= ).6 Thus, the equilibrium eﬀort
levels (∗
1 ∗
2) are characterized by the two ﬁrst-order conditions
((
∗





























 ()] · ( − ) − 00()  0 for all    .
7Note that 
 is independent of  because of our assumption 2
 =0 .
Since 0() 
 is strictly increasing in , the equilibrium is unique and
symmetric, ∗
1 = ∗
2 =: ∗. Hence, deﬁning ∆ :=  − , equilibrium eﬀort
∗(1 2∆) is implicitly given by
((





∗) · ∆ − 
0(
∗)=0  (3)
Implicit diﬀerentiation of equation (3) leads to our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 If 2
  0 and 1 6= 2,t h e n∗(1 2∆) can be de-
creasing in the technology parameter . In particular, we obtain ∗
  0 if
2
 =0 .






































1(∗) ≥ 0, the second term on the right-hand side of (4) is
non-negative. Thus, we can obtain ∗
  0 only if the ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side is negative. For 1 6= 2 and 2
  0,w ee i t h e rh a v e
0((∗ 1)−(∗ 2))  0 and 
(∗ 1)−
(∗ 2)  0 (if 1  2)
or 0((∗ 1) − (∗ 2))  0 and 
(∗ 1) − 
(∗ 2)  0 (if
1  2) because 
  0 and (·) is single-peaked at zero.
Proposition 1 shows that, if ability and technology are complements and
workers are heterogeneous, adopting an enhanced production technology may
have an adverse eﬀect on eﬀort, i.e., decrease workers’ equilibrium eﬀort
7For 1 = 2, equation (3) boils down to (0) · 
1(∗) · ∆ − 0(∗)=0 .H e r e ,
∗ ≥ 0 due to 2
1(∗) ≥ 0.
8choices. This is always the case when the technology does not aﬀect the mar-
ginal productivity of eﬀort (i.e., 2
 =0 ). The intuition for this ﬁnding can
be best seen by inspection of (3): Since (·) is single-peaked at zero, equilib-
rium eﬀorts will be lower the higher |(∗ 1) − (∗ 2)|. As technology
and ability are complements, a better technology makes an initially asymmet-
ric contest with 1 6= 2 even more asymmetric (i.e., |(∗ 1) − (∗ 2)|
increases), which further weakens both workers’ incentives.
4 The Firm’s Decisions
We now consider the stage where the ﬁrm decides on tournament prizes,
given the technology parameter . Anticipating workers’ equilibrium behav-
ior ∗(1 2∆),t h eﬁrm chooses  and  in order to maximize expected
output net of wage costs, i.e.,

2 · 2(
∗( ∆) )+( 1− )
2 · 2(
∗( ∆) )+
2(1 − ) · [(
∗( ∆) )+(
∗( ∆) )]+
2 [1] − ∆ − 2
Thereby, the ﬁrm has to take into account the limited liability constraints
 ≥ 0, and the participation constraints
{ +[ ((
∗(1 2∆) 1) − (
∗(1 2∆) 2))] · ∆
−(
∗(1 2∆))} ≥ 0
{ +[ 1− ((
∗(1 2∆) 1) − (
∗(1 2∆) 2))] · ∆
−(
∗(1 2∆))} ≥ 0
Here, the expectation operator refers to the diﬀerent possible realizations of
the abilities 1 and 2,w h i c ha r es t i l lu n k n o w nt ot h ew o r k e rw h e nh es i g n s
the contract.
In order to solve the ﬁrm’s problem, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tw ec a ni g n o r et h e
9participation constraints: Under any ability match, each worker can ensure
himself a non-negative expected utility and, hence, his reservation value, by
participating in the tournament and choosing zero eﬀort. Thus, it is rational
for him to accept any contract with non-negative prizes. Furthermore, the
ﬁrm optimally chooses a loser prize  =0because a higher loser prize increases
the ﬁrm’s labor costs but decreases workers’ incentives, according to (3).






∗( ) )+( 1− )
2 · 2(
∗( ) )+
2(1 − ) · [(
∗( ) )+(
∗( ) )] −  (5)
Let ∗ () denote the solution to (5).
Now we turn to the ﬁrst stage, where the ﬁrm chooses the production














∗) )] − 
∗()
Although the ﬁrm faces a binary decision problem, diﬀerentiation of the
objective function with respect to  is helpful for deriving our results on the
optimal technology choice. Applying the envelope theorem, the impact of
8For brevity we skipped 2[1].







































































The partial derivatives of  with respect to  reﬂect the direct eﬀect of a
marginal technology improvement on output in a given tournament match.
This eﬀect is always positive by the assumption that 
  0.T h er e m a i n i n g
terms characterize the impact of an enhanced technology on workers’ eﬀort
choices and, consequently, output. By the proof of Proposition 1, in the two
homogeneous matches where workers are either both of low or both of high
ability, equilibrium eﬀort is increasing in the technology parameter , i.e.,
∗
 (  ∗) ≥ 0 for  = . However, if workers are heterogeneous,
equilibrium eﬀort may be decreasing, i.e., ∗
 (  ∗)  0 is possible.
As outlined in the discussion of Proposition 1, ∗
 (  ∗)  0 partic-
ularly holds if eﬀort and technology are independent and if technology and
ability are complements. In such a situation, a better technology   
exacerbates the problem of asymmetric tournament competition and leads
to a negative incentive eﬀect. If this negative incentive eﬀect dominates the
direct positive impact of technology on output for all  ∈ [ ], then the
ﬁrm will optimally choose the less productive technology .
Proposition 2 If ∗
 (  ∗)  0, then the ﬁrm may prefer technology
 to .
11In order to identify further determinants that prevent the adoption of a
superior technology, we now consider the more speciﬁc production function
( )= +  (7)
At the tournament stage, production function (7) together with condition
(3) leads to equilibrium eﬀort

∗ =  (((1 − 2))( − )) (8)
where  (·) denotes the (monotonically increasing and concave) inverse func-
tion of marginal costs 0 ().9 Clearly, in production function (7), ability and
technology are complementary, whereas the marginal productivity of eﬀort
is independent of the implemented technology. By Proposition 1, this leads
t oas i t u a t i o nw h e r e∗(1 2 ∗)  0 in a heterogeneous tournament
match with 1 6= 2.S i n c e (·) is single-peaked at zero, we immediately
obtain this result from (8) as well.
A tt h es t a g ew h e r et h eﬁrm chooses the optimal tournament prize ∗(),
the ﬁrm’s strictly concave objective function reads as
()=
2 · 2[ ((0))+]+( 1− )
2 · 2[ ((0))+]+
2(1 − ) · [2 ((( − )))+(  + )] −  (9)
with solution ∗() being implicitly given by
2[






∗)(( − ))=1  (10)
At the ﬁrst stage, diﬀerentiating (∗) with respect to  and making use of
9Concavity follows from 000()  0.










2(1 − ) · [2
0 ((( − ))
∗) · 
∗ · ( − ) · 
0(( − ))+(  + )]
Thus, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Let the production function be given by (7).T h eﬁrm will prefer
 =  to  =  if
−2
0 ((( − ))
∗)·
∗·( − )·







for all  ∈ [ ].
Both sides of condition (11) are positive since ( − )·0(( − )) 
0. The left-hand side captures the detrimental incentive eﬀect of a better
technology, whereas the right-hand side measures the beneﬁcial direct impact
of a technology improvement on output. Condition (11) emphasizes the role
of worker heterogeneity for technology choice. Clearly, the condition cannot
be satisﬁed for a degenerate distribution of worker abilities, that is for  → 0
or  → 1. I nt h a tc a s e ,t h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f a heterogeneous worker match
tends to zero. Consequently, the detrimental incentive eﬀect of technology
enhancement almost never occurs and, thus, the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts
by adopting the better technology. Using  −  as a measure for worker
heterogeneity provides the same insight: As − approaches zero, the left-
hand side of (11) also goes to zero so that the condition cannot be satisﬁed
either.
Intuitively, the ﬁrm should adopt the better technology if workers’ ef-
fort choices are not very responsive to incentives. Then, equilibrium eﬀorts
are rather small under either technology and, consequently, the detrimental
incentive eﬀect of a technology improvement is negligible. Eﬀort responsive-
ness is low when the marginal eﬀort cost function 0() is steep and/or the
winner of the tournament is determined by luck rather than eﬀort, i.e., if the
variance of the random variable  is large. To formally show that this intu-
13ition is true, we now consider an example that allows to explicitly determine
the tournament prize ∗.10
Let 2−1 be normally distributed with 2−1 ∼  (02) and eﬀort costs
be given by the exponential function ()=e x p{ · }−1 with 0.11 At



















Obviously, ∗ decreases in |1 − 2|.I f 1 6= 2, then equilibrium eﬀort is













2(1 − )( − )
2 2
2 +2 ( +( 1− ))−
which yields the optimal winner prize ∗ = 2
. Inserting into the ﬁrm’s
















2(1 − )( − )
2 2
2 +2 ( +( 1− ))
Hence, the ﬁrm will prefer  =  to  =  if and only if (∗;) 
(∗;) ⇔
(1 − )( − )
2
2 ( + )    +( 1− ) ⇔
 []
2 ( + ) [] (12)
10Note that, due to the implicit deﬁnition of ∗, condition (11) is still too complex to
verify our previous arguments. For example, if 0 () is extremely steep, its inverse 0 (·)
will be very ﬂat, which decreases 0(( − ))∗). Thus, condition (11) is less likely
to hold. However, by (10), ∗ will also be lower under a steeper marginal cost function,
which increases 0(( − ))∗). Similarly, when the variance of  is large, the
density (·) is ﬂat, which tends to decrease (( − )) and 0(( − )) but has
an ambiguous eﬀect on ∗.
11An exponential function allows for suﬃciently steep cost increases to guarantee exis-
tence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in the tournament. Such cost function has also be
used by Tadelis (2002), Kräkel and Sliwka (2004) and Kräkel (2008).
14with  [] denoting the variance and  [] the mean of unknown worker
ability from the ﬁrm’s perspective.
Condition (12) can now be nicely interpreted. Again, the left-hand side
characterizes the detrimental incentive eﬀect of a better technology, whereas
the right-hand side measures the positive direct impact on expected output.
The condition will be satisﬁed if  and 2 are rather small, which captures
our intuition from above: If  and 2 were large, equilibrium eﬀorts would be
small since high marginal costs and a large inﬂuence of luck discourage both
workers from implementing high eﬀort. Then, the negative incentive eﬀect
of technology improvement is not decisive for the ﬁrm’s technological choice.
Furthermore, condition (12) holds for large values of  − , i.e., for a
suﬃciently high degree of worker heterogeneity. In that case, the negative
incentive eﬀect of a more advanced technology is particularly strong (compare
(8)). This ﬁnding will be reinforced if technology itself has a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on output and, hence, the outcome of the tournament, i.e., if +
is large. This also means that the ﬁrm should not adopt the better technology
if output is particularly responsive to ability (i.e., 
 =  is large).
Finally, we can compare the technology choices of a ﬁrm in two hypotheti-
cal situations  and  that are characterized by diﬀerent ability distributions
in the labor market. Let  []=(1 − )( − )
2 denote the vari-
ance and  []=+(1− ) the mean of workers’ unknown ability
in situation  ( = )w i t h []  []. That is, situation  = 
oﬀers, on average, a better worker pool than situation  = . Then, con-
dition (12) states that the ﬁrm may prefer the advanced technology only in
 =  but not in situation  =  This is the case if  [] −  [] is
suﬃciently large. In other words, although ability and technology are com-
plements, an improved labor market (in terms of worker ability) may not
foster the adoption of better technologies if the improvement is accompanied
by higher talent uncertainty.
155U n e v e n C o n t e s t s
So far, we have focussed on asymmetric tournaments in form of "unfair con-
tests" in the sense of O’Keeﬀe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984). Such con-
tests lead to a situation where heterogeneous agents work equally hard in the
tournament game. The case of "uneven contests", where workers of diﬀerent
abilities choose diﬀerent eﬀort levels, is analytically more complex, but yields
similar results. Heterogeneous workers implement diﬀerent eﬀorts if, e.g.,
ability and eﬀort are no longer assumed to be independent, i.e., 2
 6=0 .
We focus on the case 2
  0, which means that the marginal productiv-
ity of eﬀort increases with the worker’s ability and, consequently, eﬀort and
ability are complementary. The case 2
  0, where higher ability makes
eﬀort less productive, seems rather unreasonable and is therefore neglected.
It can be shown12 that the adverse incentive eﬀect arises for heterogeneous
workers under similar circumstances as in the unfair contest. With ability
and eﬀort being complements, the more talented agent works harder than
the less talented one in a heterogeneous tournament match. Then, for the
more able worker, technology adoption has qualitatively the same eﬀect on
eﬀort as in the unfair contest: If ability and technology are complements
( 2
  0)a n d ,i na d d i t i o n ,e ﬀort and technology are independent ( 2
 =
0),13 t h em o r ea b l ew o r k e rw i l la l w a y sd e c r e a s eh i se ﬀort under the superior
production technology. Under the same circumstances, the eﬀect on the less
talented worker’s eﬀort is ambiguous. On the one hand, as in the unfair
tournament, he is discouraged by the fact that his more able colleague can
take greater advantage of the new technology. However, on the other hand,
due to the diﬀerent eﬀort choices, now there is a counteracting eﬀect on
eﬀort: The reduced eﬀort of the more able agent improves the chance for
the less able worker to win the contest and thus encourages him to increase
his eﬀort. Nevertheless, since equilibrium eﬀort of the more able worker is
unambiguously reduced we should in general expect total eﬀort ∗
1 + ∗
2 to
decrease under the advanced technology.
12The proofs for this subsection are given in the appendix.
13For example, let the production function be ( )= + .
16By contrast, if ability and technology are substitutes ( 2
  0),14 the
more able worker will always increase his eﬀort when the ﬁrm introduces a
better technology. Again, the eﬀect on the less able worker’s equilibrium
eﬀort is ambiguous, but total eﬀort can be expected to increase under the
advanced technology. Thus, to sum up, in analogy to the case of unfair
contests, the ﬁrm may prefer not to adopt the advanced technology if ability
and technology are complements.
6C o n c l u s i o n
T h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i sh a ss h o w nt h a taﬁrm that uses rank-order tournaments
to provide its workforce with eﬀort incentives may refrain from implementing
an advanced production technology, even if the adoption of this technology
is free. A necessary condition for the ﬁrm to prefer an inferior technology
is that a worker’s ability and the production technology are complementary,
i.e., a better technology raises the productivity of more able workers more
strongly. Then, under an enhanced technology, competition among heteroge-
neous workers becomes more uneven. As a consequence, workers are discour-
aged from exerting eﬀort. If this adverse incentive eﬀect is suﬃciently strong,
it outweighs the advantageous eﬀect of an increased productivity under the
new technology.
The adverse incentive eﬀect is the stronger the more responsive the work-
ers’ eﬀort choice is to incentives. In particular, this means that ﬁrms which
are able to assess workers’ performances quite precisely (i.e., 2 is low) are
less inclined to adopt a superior production technology than ﬁrms with a less
accurate monitoring technology. Thus, production and monitoring technolo-
gies are substitutes.
Moreover, higher talent uncertainty among workers exacerbates the ad-
verse incentive eﬀect of a new technology. Presuming that talent uncertainty
decreases as workers stay longer with the ﬁrm and are promoted along the
ﬁrm’s hierarchy, our analysis suggests that a ﬁrm beneﬁts more from intro-
14Let, e.g., the production function be ( )= + 
 +  with 2  .
17ducing new technologies on higher layers. Thus, taking into account costs for
technology adoption, new technologies (e.g., computer systems) should ﬁrst
be implemented on higher hierarchy levels, while adoption on lower levels
takes place as technology costs decrease.
We have focused on a situation where the ﬁrm can use only relative in-
centive schemes because workers’ performance signals are unveriﬁable and
relational contracts are not feasible. However, in practice, the ﬁrm may pre-
fer relative performance pay to an individual incentive scheme even if the
latter is, in principle, available. The reason is that rank-order tournaments
have further advantages over individual performance pay. For example, under
a tournament scheme, the costs of measuring performance are low because
only an ordinal, unveriﬁable measure is needed. Furthermore, if workers are
risk-averse, tournaments can lower risk costs by ﬁltering out common shocks.
Our analysis implies that, given the feasibility of diﬀerent forms of incentive
contracts, a ﬁrm may want to revise its incentive scheme after the adoption
of a new production technology. For example, before the availability of a
new production technology, the ﬁrm might prefer relative performance pay
to individual incentive contracts because the former exhibits lower costs for
measuring employee performance. However, after technology adoption, it
might be worthwhile for the ﬁrm to invest in a monitoring technology that
allows to apply individual performance pay. Then, the ﬁrm avoids the ad-
verse incentive eﬀect that would occur under a relative incentive scheme. In
general, our analysis identiﬁes a new comparative advantage of individual
incentive pay if (i) worker ability and the production technology are com-
plements and (ii) the adoption of advanced technologies is crucial for ﬁrm
success.
18Appendix — Uneven Tournaments
In this appendix, we consider the case 2
  0,w h i c hr e s u l t si na nu n e v e n
tournament. Our aim is to show that, as in the unfair tournament, an adverse
incentive eﬀect may arise under technology adoption. Analogous to the case
of unfair tournaments, one can derive the ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing
the equilibrium eﬀort levels ∗
1 and ∗
2 (compare (1) and (2)):
((
∗
























If workers are homogeneous (i.e., 1 = 2), the equilibrium is symmetric and
the equilibrium eﬀort is always non-decreasing in the technology parameter.
Thus, as in an unfair tournament with equally talented workers, there is no
adverse incentive eﬀect. Now assume that workers are heterogeneous and,
w.l.o.g., let worker 1 be the more able worker (i.e., 1  2). Then, by
(13) and (14), the more talented agent works harder (i.e., ∗
1  ∗
2)b e c a u s e
2
  0.D e ﬁne agent ’s marginal beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n ge ﬀort as
Γ := ((
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 ) · ∆  6=   =1 2













































































 =d e tdet and
∗
2
 =d e tdet.T od e t e r m i n e
the sign of det, ﬁrst note that Γ1
2 = −Γ2
1. Furthermore, concavity of a
worker’s optimization problem requires that
Γ
 − 00(∗
)  0. Hence, we





































2 and (·) is single-peaked at zero, we obtain Γ1
2  0 and
Γ2
1  0. Intuitively, the harder working agent 1 beneﬁts more from increasing
eﬀort if agent 2 catches up. On the other hand, if agent 1 increases his eﬀort,
it is less beneﬁcial for the less able agent 2 to exert more eﬀort. Furthermore,























If ability and technology are complements (i.e., 2
  0), and eﬀort and
technology are independent (i.e., 2
 =0 ), we obtain
Γ
  0.C o n s e -
quently, in this case, det0 and worker 1’s eﬀort is decreasing in .
Thus, for worker 1, we have a similar situation as in the unfair tournament:
He always lowers his eﬀort under an advanced technology if 2
  0 and
2
 =0 . Intuitively, a better technology lowers his own and his colleague’s
marginal beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n ge ﬀort, Γ1 and Γ2 respectively, so that worker
1 unambiguously prefers to lower eﬀort. By contrast, the sign of det and,
hence, the eﬀect of an advanced technology on worker 2’s eﬀort is ambiguous.
The reason is that there are two counteracting eﬀects: First, the new tech-
nology lowers Γ2. However, the lower eﬀort of worker 1 increases Γ2,t h e r e b y
encouraging worker 2 to raise his eﬀort. Thus, it is not clear whether worker
2 will increase or decrease eﬀort. Altogether, since the equilibrium eﬀort of
20the more able worker is unambiguously reduced, the overall eﬀect of a better























































If ability and technology are substitutes (i.e., 2




  0. Hence, det0 and worker 1 increases his eﬀort under
technology adoption. The eﬀect on worker 2’s eﬀort is again ambiguous:
The technology eﬀect favors higher eﬀort. However, the higher eﬀort of his
colleague discourages worker 2.
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